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Abstract: When producing anonymised microdata for research, national 
statistics institutes (NSIs) identify a number of 'risk scenarios' of how 
intruders might seek to attack a confidential dataset. This approach has 
been criticised for focusing on data protection only without sufficient 
reference to other aspects of confidentiality management, and for 
emphasising theoretical possibilities rather than evidence-based attacks. 
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An alternative, ‘user-centred’ approach offers more efficient outcomes and 
is more in tune with the spirit of data protection legislation, as well as the 
letter. The user-centred approach has been successfully adopted in 
controlled research facilities. However, it has not been systematically 
applied beyond these specialist facilities. 
This paper shows how the same approach can be applied to distributed 
data with limited NSI control.  It describes the creation of a scientific use file 
for business microdata, traditionally hard to protect. This case study 
demonstrates that an alternative perspective can have dramatically 
different outcomes as compared with established anonymization strategies; 
in the case study discussed, the alternative approach reduces 100% 
perturbation of continuous variables to under 1%. The paper also considers 
the implications for future developments in official statistics, such as 
administrative data and ‘big data’.  
Key words: statistical disclosure control, risk management, statistical data 
confidentiality, data anonymisation 
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1. Introduction 
Government bodies collecting and publishing data are increasingly required 
to produce research datasets from the same sources used for aggregate 
statistics. Allowing access to this microdata effectively leverages the 
investment in data collection. As data collected by government are typically 
confidential, the dataset is rarely released ‘as is’ but has confidentiality 
protection measures applied to it. 
National statistical institutes (NSIs) carry out this function to a greater or 
lesser degree and have sponsored much research on reducing re-
identification risk in datasets. There is a large academic literature to 
support such processes, as well as automatic tools such as µ-Argus 
(http://neon.vb.cbs.nl/casc/mu.htm) and SDCMicro (http://cran.r-
project.org/web/packages/sdcMicro/index.html). 
However, there is also a strong perspective about the way that the tools 
should be used. NSIs tend to be risk-averse [1], more comfortable (in our 
experience) with the ‘policing’ than the ‘sharing’ approach to data access and 
focused on the statistical product rather than the use to which it is put. This 
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leads to “best practice” models that emphasise the protection of data in 
extreme circumstances. We refer to this as the ‘data centred’ approach, and 
it dominates the literature on this topic. 
In recent years a small but growing literature has challenged the data-
centred approach to risk assessment [2]. The challenge is based on both 
theoretical grounds and on decades of empirical evidence about how 
intruders and researchers actually use such data files. The ‘user-centred’ 
approach to risk management focuses on the circumstances in which data is 
used (how, where, why, by whom), placing the primary emphasis on factors 
other than inherent risk in the data. This is effectively switching the objective 
function and restriction within the optimisation problem [3]: in the user-
centred approach the objective is to maximise analytical validity subject to 
not exceeding some predefined level of data protection, and vice-versa in the 
traditional model. 
Changing the perspective can make substantial improvements to the utility 
of the dataset while preserving the nature of the data. This can also satisfy 
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NSI objectives as the model leads to greater security and improves the 
prospects for positive user engagement. 
This user-centred perspective was developed in the context of (remote) 
controlled access research facilities. In these, it is straightforward to 
demonstrate that the user centred approach is both more secure and more 
cost-effective, and the approach is increasingly seen as best practice. Such 
facilities have been one of the great success stories for NSIs in recent years, 
allowing unprecedented access to confidential data for research. 
However, most research use of NSI data is still via datasets distributed to 
researchers to use on their own machines. Even business microdata have 
been disseminated. These tend to be more identifiable than individual data, 
so the creation of SUFs based on business surveys meeting national 
legislation on data protection is much more complicated. Nevertheless, 
DeStatis in Germany, for instance, has distributed SUFs and PUFs containing 
cross sectional and (since 2008) longitudinally linked business microdata [4, 
5].  Despite concerns about the increasing vulnerability of distributed data 
[6], this is unlikely to change in the near future as there are significant cost 
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advantages to the NSI and benefits to society in distributing low-risk 
datasets, and researchers like having microdata on their desktops.  
At first glance, distributing data does not seem suitable for the user-centred 
approach. By definition, the NSI has limited practical control over how the 
data is used once it leaves the NSI, and so traditionally NSIs have minimised 
the perceived risk in the data itself through statistical disclosure control (SDC) 
methods. This paper argues that this is a costly error: thinking about how 
researchers could use the data (in contrast to how potential data intruders 
could attack the data) can bring substantial gains to both the NSI and the 
user. 
We illustrate with a case study the creation of a ‘scientific use file’ (SUF) from 
multinational business survey data. As noted above, business data is 
generally much more identifiable than individual data, and so the production 
of business SUFs is rare and much more likely to involve perturbation of the 
data [4]. We demonstrate that an alternative perspective can have 
dramatically different outcomes: in this case, from 100% perturbation of all 
continuous variables to perturbation of under 1% of values for just one single 
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variable. This change owes nothing to new statistical information, but 
everything to a change in perspective about risks and the use of evidence. 
The next section summarises the standard approach to dataset protection. 
Section 3 critiques this, and proposes an alternative strategy. Section 4 is a 
case study in applying the alternative model to the creation of an SUF from 
confidential business microdata, and the resulting impact. Section 5 
considers the lessons learned and the implications for wider developments 
in NSI outputs. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Common approaches to anonymisation 
The literature on statistical disclosure control (SDC) has developed over many 
years. It is large, coherent, and flexible. The ESSNet Handbook on SDC ([7], 
edited and published as [8]) was the result of several EU- and Eurostat-
sponsored projects to describe the current state of the art in SDC with a 
general purpose review of the whole field. It succeeds largely because there 
is a clear and relatively uncontentious canon of results. Researchers revise 
models and provide analysis of the effectiveness of different methods, but 
the broad approach is largely unchallenged; similar approaches are described 
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in [9] or [10]. The seminal text of Willenborg ([11], revised 2001 and 2013) 
illustrates the incremental development of SDC theory.  
The Handbook notes that microdata protection should be based upon 
knowledge of the use of the data, the access requirements, the potential for 
an intruder to match external datasets, and the structure of the data itself. 
Risk scenarios are based upon actively searching for an individual, possibly 
using record linkage (see [12], for example). It is possible to generate 
estimates of the likelihood of re-identification of an individual, given an 
appropriate set of assumptions. These probabilities can then be used to 
compare alternative data protection methods.  
This approach has three near-universal features: 
• A malicious ‘intruder’ or ‘adversary’ with the resources and 
motivation to breach data security 
• A focus on worst-case scenarios 
• The use of univariate measures of ‘utility’ lost by SDC 
measures 
These are easily justified. If a dataset is protected against a deliberate, 
malicious attempt to re-identify data, it must also protect against accidental 
or non-malicious attempts which are less motivated. Similarly, worst-case 
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planning is justified as protection against less-serious cases. Finally, 
univariate metrics are the only objective measures as multivariate analysis 
involves subjective decisions about which variables to include. 
The ‘intruder’ assumption provides the rationale for an attack; it is almost 
universal, but may not be explicit. Of the eleven papers published in a 
leading SDC journal Transactions in Data Privacy in 2017-18, three talk of 
’intruders’, four of ‘adversaries’ and one of ’attackers’; two further papers 
build mathematical models without reference to an attack scenario.  
Worst-case planning assumes that an intruder has effectively, unlimited 
time and resources, plus additional information to re-identify data. This 
‘additional information’ is usually assumed to be a dataset containing some 
of the same data subjects and much the same information as the source 
but with the target variables (identifying or attribute, depending on the 
attack scenario) missing. Both datasets are assumed to be accurate; as [13] 
notes, this over-estimates disclosure risk but avoids introducing another 
level of dataset-specific subjectivity into the model. Automated tools such 
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as mu-Argus and sdcMicro use the source dataset as the ‘attack’ dataset, 
creating a pure theoretic ‘worst-case’ model of limited practical relevance. 
It could be argued that the real worst case is where the intruder has some 
specific private information on respondents, but this is unhelpful. By its 
nature, that additional information is unknowable, which means that it 
cannot be modelled and thus every SDC procedure might be differently 
affected by it in unknown ways. For the methodologist, this makes it 
impossible to prove the effectiveness of any particular technique, or even to 
demonstrate superiority over other techniques. For the same reason, 
spontaneous recognition is used for pedagogical purposes but not for 
scenario modelling [14]. 
Whilst changes in the probability of detection can be described in a 
straightforward manner, changes in the utility of the data are harder to 
quantify as this depends upon the likely uses of the data. Sophisticated 
analyses on the effect of various anonymisation methods - applied to both 
discrete and continuous variables - on the analytical validity of microdata can 
be found in [15] and [16]. However, much of the discussion of ‘utility’ focuses 
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on univariate measures, such as perturbation of mean, median, and 
percentiles, or distributional measures. For example, Fletcher and Islam [17] 
present a range of complex multi-variable metrics for utility loss, but these 
are still essentially predicting low-dimension perturbed tables (to be fair, the 
authors do not claim to be defining definitive measures, but rather an 
additional set of useful indicators; they acknowledge that the choice of 
measure must reflect the data manager’s goals). 
In summary, the theoretical basis for SDC is well-founded, coherent and 
largely uncontested. The common agreement on the use of intruders, worst-
case scenarios and univariate impact metrics has allowed for a consistent 
treatment of methodologies, so that the various pros and cons of different 
methodologies have been repeatedly analysed. This in turn has encouraged 
the development of software to automatically provide objective estimates of 
disclosure risk and the effect of protection measures.   
However, problems occur when applying this theoretical foundation to 
practical problems of data management. 
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3. Critique of common perspective 
There are three major concerns about the way microdata protection is 
implemented in practice. Two can be seen as failures to use evidence; the 
third is a case of failure of the theoretical framework for decision-making. 
3.1 Focus on data protection 
Microdata sets are classified into ‘public use files’ (PUFs, available without 
restriction to anyone), ‘scientific use files’ (SUFs, available to accredited users 
only), or ‘secure use files’ (SecUFs, available to accredited users within an 
environment controlled by the NSI; sometimes referred to as ‘controlled 
access files’). It is questionable how much attention is paid to these different 
surrounding conditions. Implicitly, most SDC models assume the dataset is 
public, as the intruder threat is unlimited and there is little or no discussion 
of non-statistical controls such as licensing or data management.  
For SecUFs and SUFs the malicious intruder is a difficult case to make. Good 
practice requires the removal of direct identifiers (names etc.) from such 
files, so identification is only possible indirectly, implying some effort on the 
part of the researcher. For SecUFs this effort is monitored and can be limited. 
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For SUFs, the effort is not monitored but still required [12]. In both cases, 
accreditation procedures and contracts are used to ensure appropriate use 
of data. 
In both cases it is clear that, if intruder threat is a genuine risk, the problem 
lies with accreditation procedures and not with anonymisation. As 
demonstrated below, restrictions on the data to guard against intruders are 
likely to be ineffective and damaging to researchers. In contrast, better 
accreditation tackles directly the problem, the non-trustworthiness of users. 
Accreditation is also easier to manage: speculating on the possibilities of 
matching databases is much more nebulous than checking whether a 
researcher genuinely has a social science degree and is employed by a 
university.  
There is also an indirect benefit: users are wary of the impact of 
anonymisation on quality; for example, in the case of the CIS data discussed 
below, researchers reported that the confidentiality protection had made 
the data too unreliable for genuine research use. Replacing anonymization 
by accreditation, at least in part, gives users more confidence in the analytical 
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validity of results and so it is more likely to make them accept the necessity 
of a proportionate level of detail reduction. 
Such evidence as there is suggests that intruder modelling is highly 
unrealistic. There are no cases (to the authors’ knowledge) of malicious 
misuse of SecUFs or SUFs in the ways identified by standard risk scenarios. 
There is ample evidence of researchers making mistakes, or circumventing 
procedures - but not to deliberately de-anonymise the data. The deliberate 
misuses were all the result of researchers ignoring or trying to reorganise 
processes for their own convenience. 
Even such non-malicious outcomes are rare. Over ten years, one controlled 
facility saw three deliberate acts of misuse and another ten or so genuine 
mistakes, set in the context of some six thousand user visits; discussions 
with managers of SUF and SecUF releases across the world suggests that 
this outcome is the norm. The most egregious case involved a group of 
researchers downloading a dataset piecemeal over a number of months 
through a flaw in the control systems; but it is worth noting that the 
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researchers did not do this to re-identify data, but for the convenience of 
having data on their desktops. 
It could be argued that no NSI would willingly share information on a 
deliberate breach because of the poor publicity, but the relatively small size 
of the international data protection community militates against such a 
case; when problems do occur they are freely discussed amongst the 
community in the spirit of improving outcomes. One could also argue that 
successful malicious breaches have occurred but remain undiscovered, 
which is theoretically true but not practically helpful. 
In summary, for SUFs and SecUFs empirical evidence suggests that factors 
other than protection of the data dominate the likelihood of successful 
protection; such non-data control measures have a forty year record of 
demonstrable effectiveness.  
For PUFs, it could be argued that intruder threat is a genuine risk, as 
potentially it only needs one person in the world to have sufficient malice or 
prurience to try to breach confidentiality protection. As the PUF is either 
openly circulated (e.g. simply by download) or delivered with low restriction 
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(e.g. requirement to register as user before download), the potential 
attackers include not just all living individuals, but all future attackers and in 
all future states of the world.  
However, protecting against any attack by any person at any time in the 
future is an impossible standard, and no law requires it. In practice, all NSIs 
explicitly or implicitly accept the “reasonableness” argument, and make 
subjective judgments about what is proportionate. In such judgements the 
value of the data, highly perturbed and/or hidden becomes relevant. The 
German ‘de facto anonymisation’ rule makes this explicit in law: a dataset is 
deemed to be non-disclosive if the cost of extracting identified information 
from the data exceeds the value of that information. More recent legislation, 
such as the EU General Data Protection Regulation 2016 or the UK Digital 
Economy Act, have moved away from defining breaches of the law in terms 
of outcomes (such as identifiable datasets); lawfulness is now embodied in 
the procedures which govern the data access, not in the data itself. 
3.2 Worst-case scenarios and spurious objectivity 
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Using ‘worst-case scenarios’ makes sense in the context of methodological 
research, where the aim is to compare methods using a common framework 
wherever possible. Such assumptions allow the relative effectiveness of 
methods to be assessed fairly, which is essential for developing 
understanding of the effect and effectiveness of different techniques. It does 
not however follow that worst-case scenarios must be used in practice, for 
four reasons. 
First, any NSI must balance costs against benefits; otherwise, the 
confidentiality problem is easily solved by not releasing the data, full stop. 
Ideally, the full range of expected costs and benefits would be assessed, but 
focusing on the worst-case scenario for the cost requires a corresponding 
increase in benefit, preventing the release of more and better microdata for 
the scientific community. As noted above, no law requires confidentiality 
protection to be valued against all other criteria; implicitly, and increasingly 
explicitly, legislation requires that data owners justify their decisions as 
‘reasonable’. 
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Second, there is no evidence to suggest that typical worst-case scenarios 
ever manifest themselves. Consider the popular assumption that (almost) 
exactly the same data as that held in the dataset is available to an intruder.   
It is well known that there are large differences between data from official 
statistics and external commercial databases (eg. [12], [18]). Although the 
aggregate statistics produced from such datasets may be similar, at the 
record level there is a poor correlation between units even when an exact 
match is possible [19]. Gregory [20] demonstrated that matching record-
level personal data to social media was much less successful than predicted. 
Studies ([6], [21]) note that the use of administrative data by NSIs does 
mean that an external agent has, potentially, access to exactly the source 
data underlying the protected dataset, However, there are many practical 
problems with this theoretical perspective; indeed, much of the empirical 
research on data linkage is focused around improving match rates rather 
than reducing identifiability. In summary in practical cases there is always 
some natural protection for the data that adds to the protection achieved 
by anonymisation procedures. 
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Despite this, NSIs often try to replicate the worst case scenario favoured in 
academic papers. It can be time consuming and expensive to generate a 
realistic external data source. For a statistical match, the commercial data 
have to be purchased from different sources, and the identifiers often have 
to be harmonized manually; for a manual test such as [20], there is the 
difficulty of getting reviewers, and the omnipresent criticism that a ‘pass’ 
for the anonymisation might be because the reviewers were not expert 
enough or did not have enough resources.  
Hence, a common technique is to match the anonymized data to the 
original survey data, with the latter pretending to represent ‘external’ data; 
this is how software such as µ-Argus creates risk assessments. This 
fabricated worst case scenario clearly should not be treated as a ‘real-
world’ test, but in practice the risk estimates generated by such models can 
be given substantial weight.  
Third, worst case scenarios are typically not that: they are the 
mathematically tractable worst cases. A realistic worst case might the 
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unplanned release of some of the original data on the internet, against 
which no anonymisation can protect.  
Finally, worst-case scenarios are no less subjective than other models. 
Skinner [22] argues that claims of objectivity in risk assessment are 
misleading; the framing of the risk assessment is decided by the NSI on 
subjective criteria. For example, the ESSNet Handbook describes a potential 
‘conservative and worst case scenario’ with only one known external data 
source being used for matching and with design, but not response, weights 
available. Clearly, both assumptions are debatable, and an NSI adopting 
these assumptions is making a subjective decision. 
Once it is recognised that worst-case scenarios are (a) inefficient for society 
and not required by legislation (b) not supported by evidence (c) 
mathematically convenient rather than true ‘worst case’ and (d) as subjective 
as any other modelling base, their use in decision-making comes into 
question. 
3.3 The default position 
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The default perspective of most NSIs is defensive: no data can be released 
unless they can be shown to be ‘safe’. The protection of the NSI is the key 
objective. However, the NSI could take the public benefit perspective: that 
data will be released unless they present a demonstrable disclosure risk. This 
does not conflict with meeting national legislation on data privacy – legal 
responsibilities are unchanged - but public benefit is now the objective.  
Many organisations formally support the ‘public-benefit’ approach, but this 
does not necessarily happen on the ground.  One author regularly addresses 
groups of data professionals, and, in shows of hands, respondents typically 
overwhelmingly agree that the public benefit perspective is preferable; 
however, when asked about their organisation, similar numbers believe that 
the defensive perspective is their organisation’s normal position. 
Functionally, “release unless not allowed to” and “do not release unless 
allowed to” are identical in legal and statistical terms; it is in the psychology 
of the data controller that they differ. NSIs typically have insufficient user 
input to influence the discussion and overcome security concerns (the 
‘diffuse benefit and concentrated cost’ often associated with lack of 
government action [23], [24]). Although in theory both positions should 
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make the same recommendations about data access, [3] demonstrates how 
these two perspectives will, in operational situations, generate different 
outcomes, with the former almost certain to restrict data access much more.  
This defensive perspective is reflected in the lack of discussion in meetings 
and the literature. A major gathering for SDC researchers, the biennial 
Worksession on Statistical Data Confidentiality (WSC), has until recently 
taken an almost exclusively defensive approach. In 2013 two sessions on data 
access were organised, with only ISTAT [22] taking a user-centred approach; 
all other papers explained how they were ‘opening up’ data access (that is, 
the default is ‘no release’) and this should be seen as a bonus for users (this 
may be changing; the 2015 WSC was also largely defensive, but devoted a 
half-day to presenters with a default-open perspective; and the 2017 WSC 
presented user-centred papers across the range of topics). 
The use of unrealistic scenarios is a consequence of this defensive stance, 
and arises from a misunderstanding of legal liability. Unrealistic assumptions 
are defended on the grounds that all practical measures need to be taken to 
protect the data (which, of course, can also lead to excessive caution over 
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statistical aggregates). This is unlikely to be true. All statistical legislation 
leaves the level of protection as something to be determined in specific 
context: for example, the German construct of De Facto Anonymity (German 
Federal Statistics Law §16(6)). Legislation does not require worst-case 
planning, recognising that it is unlikely to be good for society: designing 
strategy based on extreme hypothetical outcomes imposes costs on society 
which a more balanced view of likely outcomes would avoid.   
More importantly, the most recent legislation (such as the New South Wales 
Public Data Sharing Act 2016, the UK Digital Economy Act 2017, and the 
European General Data Protection Regulation which came into force in 2018) 
explicitly allows a range of non-statistical measures to be included when 
assessing confidentiality protection. In a world of multi-dimensional control 
options, extreme caution in one single domain is easily challenged in court. 
A more helpful discussion might be “what does the spirit of the law intend?” 
Here, laws tend to be more explicitly relativist, making reference to 
‘reasonable’ expectations, and balancing risks and benefits. This is more 
likely to be explicitly pro-release (for example in the current European 
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Commission regulation covering data access, or in the UK Freedom of 
Information Act). In short, while the public-benefit and defensive 
perspectives are both likely to be consistent with the letter or the law, the 
public-benefit argument is more likely to be consistent with the spirit of the 
law. 
4. Case study of an evidence-based risk assessment: the 2010 CIS 
The previous section noted the problems of the traditional approach to 
anonymisation: a focus on theory rather than evidence and on data rather 
than environment.  An alternative perspective is provided by the EDRU 
framework: evidence-based, default-open, risk-managed, user-centred [26], 
which tries to address the above criticisms of the traditional approach. We 
now use a case study to show how such an approach can have radically 
different outcomes. 
The dataset used in the case study is the Community Innovation Survey (CIS), 
a business survey carried out in all EU countries. Eurostat distributes a subset 
of country files, anonymised as scientific use files for research purposes. Uses 
have been very small and the perception exists among the research 
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community that the existing anonymisation method has created, at best, a 
teaching dataset rather than a research resource. 
In 2013 Eurostat commissioned a review of the protection strategy to create 
the 2010 CIS SUFs. Whilst the review recommended a number of significant 
changes (described in [27]), in the following we focus on the risk scenario and 
its consequences for protection mechanisms.  
Detail reduction for microdata typically follows five stages: 
1. Identify user needs 
2. Identify the user environment and risks 
3. Evaluate risks 
4. Determine relevant risk scenarios 
5. Apply protection measures 
 
The case study follows the same five stages, but the EDRU approach tackles 
each stage in a different manner. 
4.1 Identify user needs 
The study analysed 11 research papers using the CIS in SUF and SecUF form 
in different countries (official documents from NSIs or other government 
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departments were also analysed but these consisted exclusively of simple 
tabulations). In addition, the authors could draw on observations from nine 
years running a controlled environment, where researchers could carry out 
unrestricted analyses on the CIS. Finally, a non-systematic Google Scholar 
search was carried out. These confirmed that the overwhelming use of the 
CIS by researchers (as opposed to government agencies who hold the source 
data) was marginal analysis, particularly linear and non-linear regression. A 
key objective was therefore to retain validity in marginal analyses. 
4.2 Identify the user environment and risks 
Users have the CIS SUFs under their control, with instructions to store the 
data safely and not attempt to re-identify companies, but with no effective 
mechanism for monitoring whether the instructions are complied with. 
There is no evidence of malicious use of SUFs by genuine researchers. There 
is evidence of accidental and deliberate misuse which has the consequence 
of breaching confidentiality rules or procedures [28]. 
For business data, the most identifying information (company size and 
industrial sector) is also the most analytically useful. As a result, the most 
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commonly identified risk is spontaneous recognition of outliers; for example, 
a researcher provisionally recognising the largest company in a particular 
industrial sector, and then either publicly speculating on the identity of the 
firm or trying to augment or compare the SUF with data from external 
sources. 
However, this is a management problem not a statistical one [14], best 
addressed through licensing and training. Note also that it is not a risk that a 
researcher spontaneously notes the characteristics of an observation and 
muses on the company identity but does not follow up - there has been no 
disclosure to an unauthorised person, and no deliberate attempt to identify 
a company.  
A second risk is that the researcher may circulate the data inappropriately. 
This may be deliberate: the researcher may share the data with a colleague 
who has not signed the appropriate data access licence.  It is more likely to 
be accidental: for example, on a shared folder without checking who has 
access permissions, or taking an authorised backup on a memory stick and 
then losing it. 
 PAGE 28 
 
The third area of risk is the output produced by the researcher, where a 
mistake on the researcher’s part might lead to the publication of identifiable 
information. In general, outputs from genuine research are low risk, but 
there are a large number of categorical variables in the CIS and the interest 
in them makes the potential for disclosure by differencing larger. 
There is the risk of group disclosure. The categorical variables in the CIS make 
saturated or empty cells more likely: for example, there may be many cells 
in a table where all companies undertake a specific form of innovation. 
However, most of the CIS categorical variables are targets, not identifiers; 
someone may want to know “has your company made a product innovation 
in the last three years?”, but this is not information that can help to identify 
the respondent. 
Finally, there is always the risk from a misperceived output; for example, a 
naïve reader of a paper could assume that a statistic refers to a single 
company even if it does not. In this case, the risk is not to confidentiality but 
to the reputation of the organisations collecting and distributing the data.  
4.3 Evaluate risks 
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Re-identification risk arises from publicly available classification data 
(company size, head office location etc) and from extreme values in 
continuous attributes, such as very high turnover. However, practical 
experiments done by the authors and others in this field (for example, [18], 
[29]) suggest that exact matching on continuous variables is not a practical 
concern, although a broad search on industrial classification and location 
might be more effective. Identification may arise from matching to external 
databases, but the sampling frame is the Eurostat-compliant business 
register, which is designed to reflect economic activity with statistical 
accuracy, not financial accuracy. As is well-known (eg. [19]), NSI business 
registers are difficult to reconcile with publicly available accounting 
information which makes extensive use of financial engineering. These 
factors provide considerable uncertainty about which companies are 
included in the data, and in which organisational form.  
Much of the data in the CIS, while useful for research, has a low disclosure 
value. For example, it is a breach of information supplied in confidence to be 
able to identify that Company X has engaged in product innovation over the 
period 2008-2010; but it is of negligible commercial value (the ‘innovation’ is 
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not specified and could be anything from repackaging to a complete new 
product). Much more detailed, and useful, information is available in 
company accounts, patent applications, press releases, and so on, all of 
which will directly identify the company. Understanding the data requires 
access to the metadata (such as the original questionnaires); this is not 
impossible for an unauthorised person to find, but it adds an extra stage. In 
short, exploiting record-level data requires considerable work for relatively 
little value, and so is unlikely to be a target for hackers (or curious individuals 
finding a memory stick on a train). 
In summary, re-identification is unlikely to have sufficient certainty to be 
worthwhile: a successful and informative match is theoretically possible but 
the practical problems are large, and the value dubious. Most importantly, 
matching requires the researcher to actively search for the company; it is not 
an outcome of spontaneous recognition. The SUF licence agreement forbids 
attempting to identify any respondent; evidence on researcher behaviour 
suggests this is credible. Therefore, it appears that the risks of deliberate 
disclosure associated with researcher inquisitiveness are of a very low order. 
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4.4 Determine relevant risk scenarios 
This led to three credible risk scenarios: 
I) A researcher publishes a magnitude table with one or two 
observations in a cell 
II) A researcher comments on the dominance of one unit in some 
table’s cell 
III) A researcher comments on the dominance of one unit in the 
dataset 
These are all expected to arise as a result of error on the part of the 
researcher who doesn’t intend to publish confidential information. This 
differs substantially from the usual risk scenario which assumes deliberate 
action to re-identify companies in the microdata. The scenarios used relate 
to mistakes in the outputs of the researchers.  
4.5 Apply protection measures 
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The scenario analysis suggested that the protection measures need to 
guard against human error in interpretation and publication. This was 
achieved largely by1  
• grouping head office location 
• banding employment 
• averaging the turnover values in the upper size class by 
industry and country (microaggregation) if, and only if, the 
company could be placed in that size class with certainty and 
if it dominated the class 
The user documentation stated clearly that the data had been adjusted, to 
maintain statistical validity but to reduce certainty over the value or 
identity of any specific observation. A microaggregation marker was added 
                                                            
 
1 The detailed analysis and the full set of measures taken is described in 
[27].  This limited-circulated document may be requested from Eurostat. 
The description given here has been approved for a general scientific 
audience. 
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to the dataset to emphasise this point. The research team also created new 
variables for employment and turnover growth to support analysis. 
5. Impact of the revised risk assessment strategy 
As noted above, the 2010 CIS methodology review recommended a wide 
range of changes to the anonymisation strategy, not all of which are relevant 
here. However, the way the risk scenarios were defined had important 
implications for the anonymisation strategy. 
The previous anonymisation strategy stated that deliberate misuse was not 
deemed to be a risk. However, the logic of this position was not followed 
through: no other explicit risk was identified, and yet all observations were 
deemed to be potentially problematic. Disclosure risk was to be addressed 
by microaggregation of all continuous variables and the coarsening of 
categorical information (global recoding), which, it was argued, also reduced 
the need to test for and address dominance problems. The conceptual 
framework used in that case was defensive: ‘apply protection until it is safe 
to release’. 
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In contrast, the revised risk scenario implied a very different protection 
model. As the key risk was identified as accidental disclosure, only measures 
to tackle dominance and small cell count were put in place, apart from a 
global recode of employment. In effect, only observations at risk were 
perturbed; the conceptual framework was ‘apply protection only if it is 
demonstrably necessary; otherwise release’. Moreover, in deciding 
observations at risk, the team took account of (1) the known disparity 
between published and surveyed employment data, and (2) the sampling 
rate; both of these provide additional arguments as to why the data was 
inherently safe. 
Microaggregation was used to implement the anonymisation, with some 
adjustment of other continuous variables to maintain covariances with 
perturbed turnover data. Table 1 below summarises the old data-centred 
and new user-centred approaches. 
[Table 1 here] 
Table 2 displays the impact of the adjusting only at-risk records defined on 
the user-centred method: 
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[Table 2 here] 
Overall only 0.53% of turnover values were microaggregated; this number 
includes neighbours of at-risk observations, who were not at risk but 
microaggregated to provide cover for their neighboured at-risk responses. 
There was some small effect on means; maxima and minima were affected 
as these are single values which microaggregation will perturb by design. 
However, the medians and most percentiles were unaffected by the changes. 
The project team also carried out linear and non-linear regressions and found 
that the anonymisation procedure changed coefficients estimates by under 
5%, for all estimates significant at the 10% level. 
The method was accepted by Eurostat and approved by participating 
Member States after a methodological review. The 2010 CIS was released for 
users in 2016. The method was also subsequently applied to the 2012 CIS 
microdata, also now available. Unfortunately, there is no evidence that the 
improved data quality has increased usage: demand has been stable since 
2016 but it remains one of Eurostat’s lesser-used datasets. 
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6. Discussion and conclusion 
Microdata protection is a well-established mature field with a great deal of 
advice for NSIs trying to make confidential data accessible to a wider 
audience. However, users often express concerns that data protection occurs 
without consideration of the user experience. More recently the data 
protection community has also begun to question the profoundly 
conservative outlook found in NSIs[2]. Current research into confidentiality 
protection is still focused on the data-centred worst-case statistical analysis 
which has dominated thinking for the last half–century.  
This paper has argued that rethinking the problem may go a long way 
towards resolving difficulties, as well as being more in tune with the spirit of 
recent legislation. This has been repeatedly demonstrated in SecUF contexts, 
and to some individual SUFs (eg 16]), but this is the first time it has been 
applied systematically to a business data SUF. Anonymising distributed 
microdata appropriately does present more statistical challenges, but the 
core messages still hold: (1) understand the non-statistical risks first, and the 
remaining statistical measures are likely to be both safer and substantially 
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less harmful to the data; and (2) hard empirical evidence is a much better 
base for decision making than unrealistic worst-case scenarios.  
The example discussed, of creating scientific use files for the European CIS 
data, shows that a change in attitude can have significant consequences. A 
business dataset was used as the model because the high identifiability of 
business microdata leads to a high degree of perturbation in the traditional 
model. 
No new methods were developed: protection was a combination of two 
established methods, recoding and microaggregation. The difference came 
in the default perspective of the research team; the use of evidence in 
assessing disclosure risk; a public-benefit interpretation of what counted as 
‘reasonable’ protection; and an explicit allowance for non-statistical 
protection measures in the access environment. The end result was a dataset 
with more protection for the most risky observations than under the 
previous method, but with much less impact on data usage (very little of the 
data was perturbed at all). In addition, the strategy was also able to tackle 
dominance problems which had not previously been resolved. The ‘do not 
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disturb’ strategy of Ichim ([16], [30]) came to a similar conclusion about the 
ability to improve both security and utility by changing the perspective. 
Future trends in data are moving away from surveys to administrative data 
sources and social media, which present new problems. For example, PUFs 
based on administrative data may be re-identifiable by administrative staff 
in the supplier organisation who have access to the original data [3]. In 
November 2015 a workshop on SUFs from linked social data was held in 
Berlin at the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) on risk scenarios. 
The opinions expressed were very diverse, and the meeting concluded with 
an agreement only that systematic research on this topic is required (see  
http://www.diw.de/suf-workshop2015 for the presentations and a summary in 
German; the summary discusses Big Data on page 5). 
Changes in data use and availability imply that the problem of matching to 
external databases will become much more prevalent, at least in theory, but 
the importance is much less obvious. It is clear from this paper that simply 
reducing content in NSI datasets to prevent theoretical problems is likely to 
produce data of increasingly unacceptable quality. Given the amount of 
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perturbation needed to protect against matches when the range of potential 
matches is continually increasing, non-statistical protection mechanisms 
grounded in evidence may be a more productive route forward [31]. This is 
certainly in keeping with a larger role for non-statistical protection in recent 
laws such as the European General Data Protection Regulation. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1 Comparison of old and revised risk assessment 
 Data-centred method User-centred method 
Variables at 
risk 
All continuous variables Employment and turnover 
Observations 
at risk 
• All observations • Employment: all 
• Turnover: only 
responses in small 
groups with dominant 
observations, non-
sampled, with certainty 
over employment band 
Disclosure 
measures 
applied 
• Employment: banding 
• All other continuous 
variables: 
microaggregation, 
independently for 
each variable 
• Employment: banding 
• Turnover: 
microaggregation on at-
risk observations and 
neighbours 
• Other continuous 
variables: adjustment 
consistent with 
microaggregation 
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Table 2 Impact on turnover of user-centred approach 
Country Records changed Change in mean 
BG 0.30 % 0.33 % 
CZ 1.44 % 1.28 % 
EE 1.64 % 1.11 % 
ES 0.17 % 0.30 % 
FR 0.24 % 0.38 % 
HR 0.09 % 0.00 % 
HU 0.91 % 0.95 % 
IE 0.62 % 0.33 % 
LT 1.23 % 4.08 % 
LV 0.97 % 0.63 % 
NO 1.72 % 2.90 % 
PT 0.91 % 1.70 % 
RO 0.41 % 0.21% 
SI 1.28 % 1.00 % 
SK 2.44 % 2.66 % 
Total 0.53 % 
 
Notes: Number of records is percentage of country totals. ‘Change in mean’ is the weighted 
average difference in means across all the employment size-industry sector domains in a 
country. 
 
